ABSTRACT Handwritten signature recognition is a biometric mode that has started to be deployed. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the robustness of the recognition process against presentation attacks, to find its vulnerabilities. Using the results of a previous work, the vulnerabilities are detected and two presentation attack detection techniques have been implemented. With such implementations, a new evaluation has been performed, showing an improvement in the performance. Error rates have been lowered from about 20% to below 3% under operational conditions. INDEX TERMS Biometrics, dynamic analysis, handwritten signature, presentation attack detection, robustness evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric recognition is one of the means that can be used to identify or authenticate a citizen in an automatic way. Within the different biometric traits that can be used, one that has a direct application in many scenarios is handwritten signature. But regarding biometric recognition, handwritten signature involves two different biometric modes: the use of the static information of the signature (i.e. the graph drawn), and the use of the dynamic information of the act of signing (e.g. timing evolution of the position of the writing stylus or the pressure applied at each moment of the signature). Different studies have shown that, using dynamic signature, a better performance is obtained than using static signature, even one order of magnitude better [1] . Therefore, this paper is focused on Dynamic handwritten Signature Verification (DSV).
Several authors have worked in DSV improving its performance using different algorithms [2] . One of the most used algorithms is the use of Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [3] , which has also achieved the best results in some public competitions [4] , [5] . Nevertheless, there is room for further research in improving the application of DTW to dynamic handwritten signature, such as using the results obtained in other generic DTW works [6] .
This biometric mode has been proven to be applicable in real life, even using different kinds of devices or writing elements (e.g. stylus or finger) [7] , different stylus technologies [8] , or even under stress conditions [9] . Novel implementations such as signing in-air have also been developed by other authors [10] .
But when an authentication technique is ready for being deployed, it is essential to evaluate its vulnerabilities and solve them. This has been done with other modalities, such as fingerprint [11] or face [12] . In the case of DSV, the major vulnerability is the one related to Presentation Attacks (PA), in particular, forgeries. This paper is related to the creation of Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) mechanisms and their evaluation, so as to determine the level of robustness achieved. Therefore, this paper will first explain and summarize the previous works from the authors related to the evaluation of the robustness. This is detailed in section II. After that, section III will analyse those previous results in order to determine where the major vulnerabilities can be found, and detail a strategy to cover them. Section IV will provide a couple of PAD mechanisms, showing the obtained results in Section V. The paper will finish with the conclusions and future working lines proposed.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand this work and its impact, it is necessary to revisit a previous work from the authors. In such work [13] , authors developed an evaluation platform in order to test the robustness of handwritten signature biometrics against forgeries. This clause summarizes the evaluation methodology, as well as the results obtained.
A. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The evaluation platform was developed following all current international standards, such as the data format in ISO/IEC 19794-7 [14] , the particular evaluation conditions for handwritten signature described in ISO/IEC 19795-3 [15] , and the recent standard on the evaluation of PAD in ISO/IEC 30107-3 [16] . Such evaluation platform exploited the level of knowledge gained by the forger as he/she learns about the signature to be forged. So, the forger performs the training on the target signature following 11 levels of knowledge, as it is represented in Fig.1 .
FIGURE 1.
Knowledge-based attack levels used by the Presentation Attack Evaluation Platform developed in [13] .
The first 7 levels represent Laboratory Conditions, where a set of tools are available to the forger. In the first level, the forger does not know anything about the signature to be forged (i.e. this represents a zero-effort attack). In Level 2, the forger sees the image of the signature for only 5 seconds. Level 3 allows the forger to see the graph of the signature at all times, even facilitating a way of carbon copying the signature in Level 4. Levels 2 to 4 exploit the knowledge about the static information of the signature.
Level 5 starts with the dynamic information, showing the forger a single reproduction of the signature while it was written. Level 6 provides the forger with a signature player, with which he/she can reproduce the execution of the signature slower, faster, forward, backwards, etc. The last laboratory level merges the signature player with the carbon copy facility.
Once finished with the Laboratory Conditions, all tools are removed from the forger, and he/she is asked to forge the signature by heart. This is done immediately after finishing Level 7. Then, the user is asked to wait for one hour before trying it again, becoming Level 9. Furthermore, the forger is asked to forge it again after 4 more hours, so as to force him/her to perform any other kind of activity, such as having lunch or dinner. This is Level 10. Finally, the forger is sent back home, and asked to try the forgery again after sleeping (i.e. after another 12 hours). These last 4 levels are considered to be the simulation of Operational Conditions.
The signatures acquired with the platform will be used as PA, and they were taken using a desktop computer application and a Wacom STU-500 signing pad. In addition, operational levels were also acquired using mobile phones and tablets, both using a native stylus and the finger to sign.
The original signatures from the users are considered bonafide signatures and used as a baseline for enrolment and baseline algorithm performance. Bona-fide signatures were taken with all the devices used for forgeries (i.e. Wacom STU, mobile phones and tablets).
B. PREVIOUS RESULTS
Using such platform, a Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) based dynamic handwritten signature verification solution was evaluated. This solution is detailed in [7] , which, at the same time, is based on [17] . Within the published evaluation, an operational scenario was approached. For example, the enrolment took only the first 5 bona-fide signatures accepted by the user. For each attack level, a set of 10 forgeries were acquired. Fig. 2 illustrates the behaviour of the baseline algorithm when attacks are added. The illustration is done by using the normalized distribution curves, both for mated (i.e. intraclass distribution) in green, and non-mated (i.e. inter-class distribution) in red. In addition, the black line represents the score distribution of the attacks, and a figure is shown for each of the levels.
As it can be easily seen, as the knowledge level increases, the overlap between the black line and the green line becomes significant. In terms of error rates, Fig. 3 shows the main results.
Analysing the results, the Equal Error Rate (EER) between the Imposter Attack Presentation Match Rate (IAPMR) and the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) for the bona-fide are: Similar results for the operational conditions are found where mobile devices are used, either with a stylus or with the finger [13] . Therefore, the impact of well-trained forgeries is extremely significant for this particular algorithm. This is the reason why, in this paper, this fact is analysed and several solutions are proposed.
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS RESULTS
There are several conclusions that can be obtained by analysing the results obtained in [13] and summarized in the previous section. The first one is the ability of the forger to remember the signature even one day later. As it can be seen, error rates in levels 8 to 11 are lower than those on levels 4 and 7, but still much higher than those of the baseline. In all cases the forger success rate is close to a 20%, or much higher depending on the threshold used by the system implementer.
A second very important outcome is the fact that, by only knowing the static information of the signature, the error levels increase very significantly, going up to 23%. This contradicts the idea that a dynamic signature algorithm becomes more robust as the dynamic information is considered within the decision. In fact, the increase in the error rates when knowing the dynamic information is not as high as expected. This questions if the dynamic recognition algorithm really uses the dynamic information. The reason behind this behaviour is that the dynamic warping of the DTW algorithm works very well for fitting the different signatures from the same signer (i.e. narrowing the intra-class variability). But within that process, several dynamic-related information is removed.
In particular, one of the effects that the implementation of the DTW causes is the re-scaling of the time signals to a common duration. This allows to wrongly accept a forgery that reproduces the same variation of the signals, but performed very slowly.
Also, depending on the DTW implementation, another information lost is the number of strokes used for signing, and the length and significance of those strokes. And due to the fact that a user may vary his number of strokes among signatures, assigning strokes as to perform a stroke-based DTW is not a trivial task.
IV. PROPOSED PAD MECHANISMS
With all these considerations, a potential way to reduce the success of forgeries is to add dynamic information to the comparison process. This section proposes 2 additional metrics to be added to the comparison process as to reject forgeries.
A. NUMBER OF STROKES
The first metric is the number of strokes. As already mentioned, the number of strokes that a user draws during signing may vary, but it is most of the times within an interval. Determining the number of strokes in an ISO/IEC 19794-7 biometric record is as simple as analysing the S channel. The starting point of a stroke is determined by the transition from 0 to 1. The number of transitions represents the number of strokes.
The variation of the number of strokes depends also on the number of strokes executed. In other words, a signature with a low number of strokes may present a low number of different strokes finally drawn. But if the signature typically has a large number of strokes, the diversity of number of strokes will be larger. Therefore, the threshold to detect a signature as a potential forgery is set as a percentage of the average number of strokes during enrolment. VOLUME 5, 2017 B. SIGNING TIME
The second metric will be the time that the user needs to sign. Again, this time varies from signature to signature, and is also dependent on the length of complexity of the signature. But the variation is expected to be limited for each of the users. This metric has an advantage from the usability point of view: the user may understand a rejection if the signature has taken longer or shorter than usual.
But the variations when the signing device is in the air are much larger than the ones when the signing device is on the surface. Therefore, the time used as a basis for this metric is the time while signing, removing the time when the pointing device is in the air. The resulting time is the sum of the time needed for each of the strokes. The basis for the comparison will be the average of that time during enrolment. 
V. PAD EVALUATION RESULTS
These two additional metrics were added as initial checks before applying the baseline algorithm. For illustration purposes, the system will behave in a way that if any of the checks determine that the signature may be a forgery, a maximum distance will be assigned in the comparison. This will impact even the baseline behaviour, as many of the non-mated comparison may be considered as forgeries. Fig. 4 shows such a behaviour. It is important to note that the results shown here are based on the same dataset and enrolment conditions as the ones in [13] .
Initially it may seem that the performance of the algorithm is much better, as both distribution curves seem to be much more differentiated. Unfortunately, some of the mated comparisons are also considered as forgeries, and therefore there is still an overlap between both distributions.
In other words, the addition of a PAD mechanism always impacts the baseline performance, and sometimes could even cause a worse performance. For example, in our case, as it will be seen in Table 1 , the baseline EER will raise from 1.72% to over 2.1%, and such increase is due to the mated comparisons considered as potential forgeries.
A. RESULTS BASED ON NUMBER OF STROKES
When applying the first of the metrics, the behaviour of the system can be seen in the normalized distribution graphs of in continuous green line, the non-mated baseline in dotted red line, the new non-mated curve in continuous red line, and the forgeries in black. Both mated curves are alike (except for the small peak in the maximum distance for the new nonmated curve), therefore, only one green line is distinguished. The new non-mated curve is mostly located at the maximum distance (as in Fig. 4) , so only the non-mated baseline is visible at other scores. Forgeries distributions are the ones that vary from plot to plot, representing the behaviour for all 11 levels.
It can be seen how the attacks are well separated from mated distribution in Level 1, but as the level increases, the overlap of both curves starts to become significant. It is true that up to Level 4, the overlap is lower than in the baseline system. When the forger starts to learn the dynamics of the signature, the PAD mechanism starts to lose its discriminant power. But when analysing the EERs obtained (see Table 1 ), the system achieves worse results in all cases, as this metric has a major impact in the intra-class distribution. Graphically, major results can be seen in Fig. 6 . Therefore, this metric by itself does not provide an improvement in the performance.
B. RESULTS BASED ON THE ADDITION OF SIGNING TIME
Adding the signing time to the previous PAD mechanism, the results that can be seen in Fig. 7 (distribution curves) and Fig. 8 (DET curves) are achieved.
As it can be extracted from the visual inspection of Fig. 7 , this new PAD mechanism seems to work much better, as in all 11 levels, the attack distribution curve (i.e. the black one) does not show much of an overlap with the mated curves. Fig. 8 shows the DET curves for all levels, including also the baseline (in green) and the behaviour of the system with PAD with bona-fide signatures. All intersections with the EER diagonal are below 5%. The third column in Table 1 shows the EER values obtained in this case for each of the levels.
The highest EER is 3.1%, much lower than the behaviour of the system without PAD, and quite close to the performance obtained using only bona-fide signatures. Therefore, the detection of the forgeries is achieved by a higher discrimination of the inter-class variability.
C. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART
A direct comparison of these results with the State of the Art is nearly impossible, as there is not one work published using this methodology to test the robustness against forgeries. There is also no public database with the same characteristics than the one created for this study. But an indirect comparison VOLUME 5, 2017 can be done by analysing the results with one of the most used databases in the literature: the MCYT database [18] .
Using MCYT for the evaluation, the baseline algorithm used for this study presents an EER with bona-fide signatures (also known as random-forgeries) of 0.54%. With skilled-forgeries, the performance of the baseline algorithm reached 3.6%. These results are in the same order of magnitude of those reported in [1] and [17] .
As it can be seen, the performance results between the ones obtained with the skilled forgeries in MCYT and the progressively training samples in this study differ very significantly. This provides a new evidence of the importance and validity of the developed evaluation platform. At the same time, it also shows that the PAD techniques reported in this paper provide error rates in the same order of magnitude of the ones published in the State-of-the-Art, with a much more demanding testing database.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present paper has analysed the vulnerabilities shown in a previous work related to the evaluation of a DTW-based handwritten signature recognition solution. The vulnerabilities detected have provided ideas to design Presentation Attack Detection techniques that could improve the performance against forgeries. Two of those metrics have been reported, being the first one not effective, but becoming effective when combined with the second one. The improvement achieved is close to one order of magnitude, reducing the error rates from a percentage close to 20%, to error rates below 3%.
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